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STATE OF UTAH 
IRA ROYAL L. TRIBE, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF: 
OGDEN CITY, BRIGHAM CITY, PROVO CITY 
AND CITY OF ST. GEORGE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to de-
termine constitutionality of the Utah Neighborhood De-
velopment Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 11-19-1, 
et seq. (1973), and of actions taken and proposed to be 
taken by the Defendants and Respondents pursuant to 
to such act and to determine the proper interpretation 
of certain provisions of such act 
I Case No. 
I 13856 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, sitting without a jury, was presented 
documentary and testimonial evidence and entered de-
claratory judgment as prayed in the coiinterclaim of De-
fendants and Respondents holding that the Utah Neigh-
borhood Development Act (hereinatfer referred to as 
"The Act") is constitutional and that certain resolutions 
of certain of the Defendants are lawful and valid, includ-
ing resolutions approving a plan for the issuance of bonds 
by the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency ("Rede-
velopment Agency or Agency") for the payment of which 
certain parking revenues and "tax increments" are 
pledged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANTS 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the trial 
court and a declaration that the Act and the activities 
undertaken and proposed by the Respondents pursuant 
thereto are violative of both state and federal law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We concur with Appellant's statement of facts as 
supplemented and amplified by the Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOP-
MENT ACT, PROVIDING ENABLING LEG-
ISLATION FOR THE CREATION OF THE 
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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY DOES NOT 
VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PRO-
HIBITS THE LEGISLATURE FROM DELE-
GATING TO A SPECIAL COMMISSION 
THE POWER TO MAKE, SUPERVISE OR 
INTERFERE WITH A MUNICIPAL IM-
PROVEMENT OR TO PERFORM MUNICI-
PAL FUNCTIONS. 
Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution was 
seemingly adopted to an effort to seek relief from state 
legislative control over municipal corporations. Section 
28 (referred to as the Ripper clause) expressly withdraws 
from the legislature the power to create special commis-
sions to deal with municipal functions. These commis-
sions are prohibited because they take the functions of 
local government from elected municipal officials and 
placed them in the hands of appointed commissioners 
over whom the local taxpayers have no control. 
Under the Utah Neighborhood Development Act the 
municipal corporation together with the legislature are 
put in a position that through a joint concerted effort 
the far reaching impact of deteriorating central city areas 
can and will be rehabilitated, refurbished, or remodeled 
without tiie necessity of expenditure from city, county 
or state. 
A. THERE IS NO LEGISLATURE DELE-
GATION TO THE REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY. 
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The Utah Neighborhood Development Act, Title 11, 
Chapter 19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in 
Section 11-19-3 that each community by enactment of an 
ordinance by its legislative body may organize a rede-
velopment agency designating the legislative body of the 
community as the redevelopment agency. 
There is simply no delegation by the state legislature 
inasmuch as the acceptance and desire to use the act is 
completely discretionary upon the acceptance by the 
legislative body of the municipality and if accepted, the 
same people are the legislative body of the city and the 
redevelopment agency. This then provides the municipal 
voters not only a direct voice and control over the in-
itiation of the act but also control over the functioning 
of the agency and lastly if necessary the termination of 
the entire program. 
Appellant cited this court decision in Carter v. Beaver 
County Service Area No. 1, 16 Utah 2d 280, 399 P. 2d 
440 (1965), as authority for the invalidation of an act 
even though there was a provision for initiation of the 
district by the county. In Carter a taxpayer challenged a 
county service area act with regard to bonding and build-
ing a hospital to serve a district near Beaver. In invali-
dating the entire law without specific discussion of the 
challenged service area, the Court found: 
"The County Service Area Act authorizes 
the performance of an unlimited number of ac-
tivities; some of these might qualify as a function 
appropriately performed by a state agency, while 
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others are exclusively municipal functions, the 
performance of which is constitutionally limited 
to the unite of local government." 399 P. 2d at 
441. 
This case was decided on the issue of vagueness of 
the statute in being overly broad. The issue of local leg-
islative consent was not discussed and appellant's con-
tention that it was implicit that the consent of the county 
was not sufficient to avoid the prohibition of Article VI, 
Section 28 is unfounded. 
Appellant cites the case of Backman v. Salt Lake 
County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 275 P. 2d 756 (1962), wherein 
the legislature passed an act providing for a special elec-
tion which if approved would incorporate a civic audi-
torium district. The court found the county failed to 
follow the procedure in timing set out by the Act and 
on that particular point the court held there was an in-
validation. After the court's holding in the Backman case, 
there was a certain amount of dictum with regard to the 
constitutionality of delegation to a commission under 
municipal functions, however, even in the dictum there 
was no direct discussion on the local municipal consent 
doctrine. This court in subsequent decisions has expressly 
limited the Backman case to the issue of failure to com-
ply with procedural timing of the bond election, Branch 
v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, 23 Utah 2d 181, 
460 P. 2d 814 (1969). 
In at least two cases, this court has focused on the 
importance of local consent and initiation of a particular 
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act, thereby eliminating the direct delegation violation 
found in the constitutional provision. In Lehi City v. 
Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530 (1935), this court sus-
tained the creation of a Metropolitan Water District 
which, pursuant to statute would be approved by the 
majority of voters within the district boundaries. The 
court in its discussion of the constitutional provision, the 
same provision in issue in the instant case, remarked, 
"If it be objected that the legislature in this manner is 
usurping some of the power of local self-government, the 
answer is that before a metropolitan water district can 
be organized it must have a majority vote of the electors 
within the district in support thereof and such vote car-
ries with it an approval of the method by which the 
officers of the district shall be selected." 48 P. 2d at 536. 
The court in Lehi relied on the California case of 
City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653, 269 P. 
630 (1928). (Mifornia has essentially the same consti-
tutional provisions as Utah and in holding that Cali-
fornia Metropolitan Water District did not violate the 
"Ripper clause" the California court reasoned that the 
people themselves, not the legislature, had consummated 
the formation of the district. Later in State Water Pollu-
tion Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P. 2d 
370 (1951), this court again acknowledged that there 
was no direct delegation in cases of local consent and 
initiation. The Court said: "However, that and similar 
cases, are clearly distinguishable in that the metropoli-
tan water district was initiated by the cities desiring the 
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district and there was no direct delegation by the legisla-
ture to a board or agency which would allow it to inter-
fere with any municipal improvement, property, or func-
tion." 311 P. 2d at 376. 
We would conclude that the ruling in Lehi and Water 
Pollution Board providing for the approval by the people 
of the particular municipality is still in effect as well it 
should be. Such a finding is consistent with the high 
courts of other jurisdictions as consented by the appellant 
in his brief. In City of Whittier v. Dickson, 24 Cal. 2d 
665,151 P. 2d 5 (1944). Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 
14 Cal. 2d 37, 94 P. 2d 794 (1939); the California court 
has held that there is no delegation in violation of the 
constitutional provisions when a local option is provided. 
The Colorado Court has reached the same conclusion in 
a variety of decisions including City of Aurora v. Aurora 
Sanitation District, 122 Colo. 407, 149 P. 2d 662 (1944) 
and City of Denver v. Londery 33 Colo. 104, 80 P. 117 
(1905). 
Finally the appellant submits that there is unconsti-
tutional delegation inasmuch as the legislature is the 
source of the powers of cities and if the legislature cannot 
act because of constitutional limitations then the legisla-
ture cannot delegation to its agents, the cities and coun-
ties, the power to so act. Such an argument is not con-
sistent with the intent or Article VI, Section 28. The 
evil to be prevented by Section 28 is total domination 
by the legislature upon the municipalities and to prevent 
a separation of the power to incur debt and the responsi-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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bility for payment. Section 28 was drafted and adopted 
to protect the municipality from the legislature, not from 
the will of the municipal voters. 
B. A REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY ESTAB-
LISHED PURSUANT TO THE UTAH 
NEIGHBORHOOD ACT IS NOT A SPE-
CIAL COMMISSION, PRIVATE COR-
PORATION OR ASSOCIATION. 
The appellant correctly points out that the functions 
of a redevelopment agency may be somewhat separate 
from the functioning of the local municipality inasmuch 
as the agency may employ its own officers and employees, 
maintain separate offices; separate accounting records, 
separate payrolls and separate budget. The act in 11-
19-3 also provides: " . . . which agency shall be authorized 
to enter into contracts generally and shall have power 
to transact the business and exercise all the powers pro-
vided for in this act." 
Although the agency maintains separation from the 
city structure, this is not the fear the framers of our 
State Constitution had as pointed out in the Backman 
case by Justice Henroid, "We are convinced that the 
framers of our constitution wisely anticipated the inroads 
that might be cut in the structure of local, representative 
government, which fundamentally is composed of officials 
elected by those closest to government, the electors, when 
they judiciously insisted on Article VI, Section 29 as a 
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must in our a>nstitution." This court's concern as ex-
pressed by Justice Henroid appeared to have far reaching 
effect on the legislature in the drafting of this particular 
act inasmuch as not only must the agency be organized 
through an ordinance by the city's legislative body but 
the legislative body of the community becomes the re-
development agency of said community. The electors of 
the community then have a direct voice in the affairs of 
the agency because they in fact can remove a member 
of the agency board at the ballot box. We submit to the 
court that the agency is subject to the governing body 
of the local disitrict and therefore cannot be classified 
as a private corporation or association, or a special com-
mission. Again we emphasize to the court that Article 
VI, Section 29 was drafted to protect the local area gov-
ernment from the legislature but not from the will of the 
local voter. 
C. THE AGENCY WILL NOT INTERFERE 
WITH MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT 
AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MUNI-
CIPAL FUNCTIONS. 
In Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra, the court, 
after deciding that case on a procedural defect provided 
that in order to violate Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah 
Constitution three conditions are necessary. 1) Delega-
tion to a private commission of power; 2) To interfere 
with municipal property, or 3) to perform a municipal 
function. If the court holds that in fact there is no dele-
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gation to a private commission of power then determina-
tion of a breach the latter two conditions would be moot. 
Although the appellant contends that there will be 
direct interference with municipal improvements in as-
much as there would be traffic rerouting together with 
some changes in water and sewer lines, certainly, this 
type of temporary construction interference was not con-
templated by those responsible for putting Article VI, 
Section 29 into our Constitution. 
The trial court found after the presentation of evi-
dence, in Finding of Fact No. 10, which is uncontested 
by the appellants, as follows: 
"10. The problems relating to urban blight 
affect the entire state. The negative economic 
drain of central city areas which should be highly 
productive, the law enforcement problems effect-
ing visitors and residents alike, the health prob-
lems which spread their infectious consequences 
rapidly over enormous areas inhabited by a mo-
bile population, the fire hazards of a congested 
dilapidated center of population, and inadequate 
parking accommodations, the limited access to 
recreation center, convention facilities and tourist 
attractions are matters of primary concern for 
the entire state rather than problems involving 
purely local functions. Thus, the Redevelop-
ment Agency Plan of which the $15,000,000 bond 
issue is an integral part is a proposal which will 
have state wide impact." 
The higher court in California and Colorado reached 
the same conclusion as our local trial court, that rede-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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velopment is a function that affects the entire state and 
is a state function and not just a municipal function be-
cause of the far reaching impact of crime, health and 
economic drain. Fellom v. Redevelopment Agency, 157 
Cal. App. 2d 243, 320 P. 2d 884 (1958); In re Bunker Hill 
Urban Renewal Project, IB, 37 Cal. Rep. 74, 389 P. 2d 
538 (1964); Rabinaff v. District Court, 360 P. 2d 114 
(Colo. 1961; People v. Newton, 101 P. 2d 21 (Colo. 1940). 
The court in ruling on the issue presented in light 
of Article VI, Section 29, could dispose of the matter 
disregarding any acceptance or rejection of what has been 
termed the State Purpose Doctrine by concluding that 
there was no delegation to a special commission in the 
case at bar. 
POINT II. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY BONDS IS-
SUED PURSUANT TO THE UTAH NEIGH-
BORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE A DEBT OF THE CITY 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE XIV 
SECTION 3 AND 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTI-
TUTION. 
Section 3, of Article XIV provides that no county, 
school district, city, town, village, or any subdivision 
thereof will incur a debt which cannot be paid during the 
current year from revenues of that year unless that debt 
is submitted and authorized by a vote of the majority 
of qualified electors who vote in the election. Section 4 
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of Article XIV then provides the limit of indebtedness 
that can be incurred pursuant to Section 3. 
A. THE REDEVELOPMENT A G E N C Y 
BONDS ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED 
AN OBLIGATION OF THE CITY BE-
CAUSE THE AGENCY IS NOT A SUB-
DIVISION OF THE CITY. 
The appellant contends that the Utah Neighborhood 
Development Act does not create a redevelopment agency 
that is a separate body, politic and corporate, or as a 
separate political subdivision of the State in express lan-
guage. Appellant then characterizes the non-existence of 
such a statement as being of great significance for the 
application of the Constitution debt limits and election 
requiremnets. 
An evaluation and study of the act itself leaves no 
questions as to the intent of the legislature in setting up 
an agency separate from the affairs of the city when 
compared to a department or subdivision of the said city. 
The act is so implicit as to the separation from the city 
that direct expressions of intent would become redundant. 
In the same section of the Act that provides for initiation 
by the legislative body of the community, it sets out 
some of the powers of the agency. ". . . which agency 
may accept financial or other assistance from any public 
or private source for the agency's activities, powers, and 
duties, and expend any funds so received for any of the 
purposes of this act. The agency may borrow money or 
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accept financial or other assistance from the state or the 
federal government for any redevelopment project within 
[its area of] operation and comply with any conditions 
of such loan or grant." 11-9-3. A pursual of other sec-
tions of the act, including but not limited to 11-19-12, 11-
19-20,11-19-23.1,11-19-23.9,11-19-23.2 and 11-19-25 should 
be sufficient to sximmarily dismiss appellant's contention 
for the necessity of an express statement that the agency 
is separate from the municipality. 
There being no question as to the intent of the act 
in setting up a separate entity one must focus on the 
judiciary as to the validation of such a special entity. In 
the leading case, in this area, of Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 
Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530 (1935), the court ruled on the 
contention that the metropolitan water district act vio-
lated Article XIV Section 3 and 4 of the Constitution 
limiting debt on municipal corporations. The district pro-
vided for in the act could include the area of a number 
of local governments. The court held the district was 
quasi-municipal meeting some of the powers and attri-
butes of a municipality. The concept of quasi-municipal 
districts is reiterated in a variety of cases including Free-
man v. Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P. 2d 174 (1954), 
wherein the court referred to the principle set out in 
Lehi City as one which the people have relied on and 
should not be taken away by the court. In Provo City 
v. Evans, 87 Utah 292, 48 P. 2d 555 (1935), decided at 
the same time as Lehi, and Barlow v. Clearfield, 1 Utah 
2d 419, 268 P. 2d 682 (1954), the court did not impose 
debt limitation on quasi-municipalities which had the 
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same geographic boundaries as the city, thereby discred-
iting any argument the quasi-municipality concept ap-
plies only to special district encompassing more than one 
local government. 
Again it should be emphasized that the legislature 
appears to have followed the guidelines as set out by this 
court's decision, in drafting an act enabling local cities 
to initiate a redevelopment agency without direct dele-
gation or interference with the municipality and provid-
ing the local elector to have control over the agency board; 
and at the same time make certain that the agency is a 
quasi-municipality, separate and distinct from the local 
city and in no way a subdivision or a department of that 
city. The organization of the agency as set out by the 
act is a reflection of this Court's decisions. 
B. REDEVELOPMENT BONDS DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE A DEBT OF THE CITY. 
If tins court finds that an agency established under 
the Utah Neighborhood Development Act does qualify 
as a division of the city then we would strongly contend 
that agency bonds do not constitute a debt within the 
scope of Article XIV of our Constitution, because the 
bonds together with all interest will be paid from a special 
fund. 
This Court adopted the doctrine of the special fund 
in Barnes v. LehiCity, 74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878 (1929), 
which doctrine is adhered to in the majority of jurisdic-
tions, 96 A. L. R. 1385 (1953), 72 A. L. R. 687 (1931). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
The doctrine allows municipalities to construct or 
renew needed utilities, to keep up with the needed ur-
banization without placing an additional burden on the 
taxpayer. In Barnes the City of Lehi contracted to pur-
chase generating equipment to increase the capacity of 
an electric plant, financed by the issuance of pledge 
orders. The only source of payment was to be a special 
fund generated by the revenues produced from the elec-
tric plant. This court held the obligation was not a debt 
of the city as set out in Article XIV of the Utah Con-
stitution. 
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P. 2d 144 
(1933), placed some limitation on the special fund doc-
trinew here the special fund would create a drain on the 
general fund In Fjeldsted the city owned and maintained 
an existing waterworks supply and distribution system. 
The revenues thereby derived were to be put in the gen-
eral fund after necessary expenditures. The city sought 
to improve and repair the waterworks system by issuing 
bonds. The revalues from the waterworks system would 
then be placed in a special fund to retire the bonds where 
formerly the revenue would pour into the general fund. 
The court in Fjeldsted distinguished Barnes pointing out 
that in the Barnes case the electric plant was so dilapi-
dated that it was bringing no revenues into the city and 
general fund and the city would lose nothing when the 
revenues from the new plant would be placed in the gen-
eral fund In Fjeldsted the court pointed out that ". . . 
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in this case a large income from an existing waterworks 
system owned by the city is pledged to pay the principal 
and interest on the bonds; the greater part of the prop-
erty to be purchased or improvements made will be in-
corporated or built into the existing waterworks in such 
a manner that it could not be thereafter segregated or 
withdrawn without destruction of the new property and 
destructive impairment of the entire system." 28 Pac. 
at 28. • 
The court's apparent concern in Fjeldsted in dis-
tinguishing from Barnes was that Ogden City could not 
segregate revenue resulting from the proposed repairs and 
modifications. In fact Ogden City conceded that there 
would be no new source of revenue. The court concluded 
in Fjeldsted that an additional burden would be placed 
upon the taxpayers inasmuch as they would be forced to 
make up the deficit in the general fund that would result 
from diversion of revenue from the existing waterworks 
system. 
The facts in Fjeldsted are distinguishable from the 
tax increment concept of the Utah Neighborhood Devel-
opment Act. In tax increment no existing revenues go-
ing into the general fund will be diverted into a special 
fund. The revenues from the existing valuations will 
continue to be used as they now exist and revenues which 
come about because of the improvements will be put in 
a special fund to pay off the bonds. This concept is 
clearly within guidelines of the Barnes case and just as 
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clearly exempt from the holding in Fjeldsted inasmuch as 
only the revenue generated by the improvement will flow 
into the special fund and there will be no diversion of 
the revenues now going into the general fund. This 
court's language in Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 
Utah 321, 28 P. 2d 161 (1933), a companion case to 
Fjeldsted seems to go right to the heart of the issue in 
the instant case. The court held "Where improvements 
or betterments are built into an existing system or pro-
ject, the revenues earned by such improvements or bet-
terments, based on proper appraisement of the old sys-
tem and the improvements and betterments may be 
pledged to the payment of revenue bonds as provided in 
the Act without vote of the qualified taxpaying electors 
. . ." 28 P. 2d at 175. 
It appears that a discussion of Fjeldsted may be un-
necessary in light of the court's decision in Conder v. 
University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P. 2d 367 (1953), 
where the court would not apply the Fjeldsted restriction 
in aUowing the bonds to be repaid from a special fund 
revenue of which part had previously been put in a gen-
eral fund. It appears that Fjeldsted may in fact be over-
ruled or at least limited to the isolated facts of that par-
ticular case. If overruled, Utah would then be brought 
into oonfbiimity with the majority of jurisdictions. 
POINT III. 
THE P R O P O S E D REDEVELOPMENT 
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AGENCY BONDS WILL NOT INVOLVE 
LENDING OF CREDIT BY THE CITY, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY OR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Utah Neighborhood Act in Section 11-19-23.3 et 
seq. prohibits any lending of credit by the city. Further, 
we would reiterate our argument we have provided in 
Point II of this brief dealing with a special fund concept, 
as being determinative of this issue. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
THAT THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-
TION OF THE PROPOSED PARKING FA-
CILITY INVOLVES PUBLIC PURPOSES. 
We would affirm the arguments as set forth in Re-
spondent's Brief. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD 
THAT THE ALLOCATION OF TAXES FOR'"'"" 
REDEVELOPMENT PURPOSES AND THE 
USE OF THESE AND OTHER FUND IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE REDEVELOP-
MENT PROJECT DOES NOT VIOLATE AR-
TICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
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Article XII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides: 
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal awrporation, but may, by law, vest in 
the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, 
the power to assess and collect taxes for all pur-
poses of such corporation." 
There is nothing in this section of our Constitution 
which is violated by the Utah Neighborhood Develop-
ment Act. The legislature in this act does not impose 
taxes for the purpose of the cities but vests in the local 
governmental body the right to initiate the tax increment 
concept and in so doing allocate increased revenues from 
higher assessed valuation resulting from redevelopment. 
The enabling provisions of the Development Act 
follows the provisions and requirements of Section 5. 
We would further concur with the additional argu-
ments on this point as set forth by respondent. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
ITS DETERMINATION THAT B U D G E -
TARY LAWS REGULATING CITIES ARE 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE REDEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY. 
We would affirm the arguments as set forth in Re-
spondent's Brief, 
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POINT VII. 
THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF TAXES 
USING AN ASSESSED VALUATION BASE 
DETERMINED IN 1970 IS NOT AN UNCON-
STITUTIONAL RETROACTIVE APPLICA-
TION OF A STATUTE WHERE THE MILL 
LEVY TO BE APPLIED TO THE VALUA-
TION BASE IS PROSPECTIVE. 
We would affinm the arguments as set forth in Re-
spondent's Brief. 
POINT VIII. 
APELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET 
THE BURDEN OF OVERCOMING A PRE-
SUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY AND CON-
STITUTION OF THE UTAH NEIGHBOR-
HOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT AND THE 
VALIDITY AND CORRECTNESS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT HOLDING. 
We would affirm the arguments as set forth in Re-
spondent's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The cities of Ogden, Brigham, Provo and St. George 
respectfully submit to this honorable court that the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act does not violate the let-
ter or spirt of the Utah Constitution but in fact follows 
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the guide lines of both the Constitution and the inter-
pretation given the Constitution by this Court. 
Thet Act including the bonding provisions thereof 
provide the cities of this state a feasible method to re-
develop and rehabilitate their central city of their blighted 
conditions. Through rehabilitation, made possible by the 
tax increment concept, Utah cities can look for the re-
duction of crime, health and economic problems. The 
Act also provides for an agency which can act as a 
conduit for federal monies coming into Utah cities for 
redevelopment. 
We submit there is no delegation by the legislature 
to a special commission inasmuch as the local govern-
mental body initiates the program and the voter through 
the ballot box can control the actions of the agency. 
The agency bonds will not constitute a debt of the 
city because the legislature has made it very clear that 
the agency is not a subdivision or department of the city. 
If this court rules the agency is simply a department of 
the city the bonds should not be considered a debt of the 
city as a result of this Court's adopting the special fund 
doctrine. 
The Redevelopment Agency bonds will not involve 
lending of credit by the city and the allocation of taxes 
for redevelopment does not violate the constitution be-
cause it is not an imposition upon the cities by the leg-
islature but rather an enabling power given to them in 
conformity with the Constitution. 
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We, therefore, urge this Court to uphold the trial 
court's decision in declaring the Utah Neighborhood De-
velopment Act constitutional. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
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